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Introduction
Repeated games are frequently used to model repeated strategic interaction between impatient economic agents. Usually, it is possible to sustain equilibria that do not arise in a one-shot game by repeating it. The associated payo¤ vectors, moreover, can be Pareto superior to the ones achieved in all stage game equilibria. The well-known Folk Theorem states this result. This paper focuses on in…nitely repeated discounted games for which Fudenberg, Levine and Takahashi (2007) , thereafter FLT, obtain the subgame-perfect Folk Theorem. They dispose of any dimensionality condition previously imposed by Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) and by Abreu, Dutta and Smith (1994) , thereafter ADS, and moreover, extend the result of Wen (1994) to (unobservable) mixed actions.
For simplicity, other strong assumptions are normally imposed, for example, that a player observes his opponents'behavior immediately and perfectly. To relax this assumption is the aim of the imperfect monitoring literature, in which each player receives an imperfect private or public signal of the action pro…le played. Under certain conditions, the set of sequential equilibria, or of other equilibrium concepts that extend subgameperfectness to repeated games of imperfect information, is usually non-empty. In some cases even the Folk Theorem obtains. The interested reader is referred to a private monitoring survey by Kandori (2002) and Mailath and Samuelson's (2006) textbook.
The aim of this paper is to model delayed perfect monitoring by allocating the players, that play an in…nitely repeated discounted game, to a connected and undirected network. In each period, a player observes his neighbors' action choices and communicates nonstrategically, that is truthfully, these observations and other information he has received before to all neighbors. The players thus take decisions under imperfect information in any but the …rst period and the concept of sequential equilibrium is used. Nevertheless, the entire history of the repeated game spreads gradually throughout the network over time. The network gives a structure to this heterogeneous ‡ow of information. It is also possible, however, to interpret the delay in information transmission as being due to the time it takes a player to process information or to react to new information. 1 In reality, impatient economic agents frequently form a network due to which the information ‡ow is delayed. In many industries, such as the car industry, big producers are at the center of a large network of suppliers, which may be linked among themselves. Links are enforced by long-term contracts or relationships and high …nes are levied on …rms that break such a contract. (The …nes must be credibly enforceable which motivates the use of sequential equilibrium.) The network is usually organized along the value chain and information about a …rm's non-compliance with certain quality or service standards spreads only slowly throughout the network until it reaches the center. In turn, the big …rm at the center of the network might communicate changes in quality requirements or product speci…cations to its suppliers. Sometimes it also imposes price reductions on their products. The suppliers decide whether to accept the proposed changes and if or how to enforce them on their suppliers, respectively. Information may thus ‡ow back again to the center, for example, when a small …rm in the network's periphery threatens to either accept a price reduction for its products and to go bankrupt thereafter or to continue as before. The theoretical model developed in this paper encompasses some of the key features just described, although it also abstracts from some of them. This model can be applied in several other contexts, some of which are mentioned in the conclusion.
Under the assumption of truthtelling, the Folk Theorem extends to the delayed perfect monitoring model, that is, any feasible and strictly individually rational payo¤ vector can be supported by a sequential equilibrium strategy pro…le when the players are su¢ ciently patient. Then, they do not mind to receive the repeated game's history of action pro…les gradually over time. However, for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the delay in information transmission caused by the network may trigger a player's deviation from some previously agreed sequence of play. The reduction in the set of sequential equilibria in comparison to the perfect monitoring case, which arises when players are impatient, seems to re ‡ect many real situations well. Moreover, the concept of punishment reward is adapted to the network case and in order to analyze a general class of games, no restriction is imposed on the dimensionality of the payo¤ space. 2 As a consequence, the introduction of strategic communication becomes more involved and the e¤ective minmax concept has to be used. This model also contributes to the network literature in which the clustering coe¢ cient, or similar measures of local connectedness, usually determine the level of cooperation sustainable in a network. Conversely, in this model, the network's diameter is decisive. The two measures are not related as is illustrated in an example.
The related literature can be roughly divided into three setups. In the …rst one, each pair of neighbors in a network plays a bilateral repeated game. A player's communication and observations are restricted to his neighborhood as well, that is, they are also bilateral. In the second group of models, all players play the same repeated game and a player observes an imperfect private or public signal of the action pro…le played, or a bilateral observation structure imposed by a network is assumed. Communication takes the form of public announcements of past signal realizations or of own behavior in the past. Hence, all players are informed about the repeated game's history at the same time. All models in this group, additionally, assume a full-dimensional payo¤ space and allow for strategic communication. Finally, a setup as in this paper is characterized by a bilateral communication and observation network in which all players play the same repeated game, but never have to report their own action choices. Only Renault and Tomala (1998) also derive a model with these characteristics.
Nevertheless, two papers from the second group are also important since they assume a bilateral observation structure. Ben-Porath and Kahneman (1996) study sequential equilibria of in…nitely repeated discounted games in which the players form a (not necessarily connected) network. They assume that players publicly announce their own action choices and observations made about their neighbors in a strategic way, that is, including lies. When each group contains strictly more than two players unilateral deviations are detectable, and hence, do not occur in equilibrium. In Ben-Porath and Kahneman (2003) this idea is extended. Since monitoring is costly, only one monitor is assigned to every player. After an incompatible announcement, which in equilibrium does not occur, both players are punished and the monitor is substituted. Renault and Tomala (1998) , in turn, show how to sustain uniform Nash Equilibria-which is a weaker concept than sequential equilibrium-in …nitely and in…nitely repeated undiscounted games when the players form a 2-connected and directed graph. Since this implies that there are two distinct paths between any pair of players, lies are prevented in equilibrium. In their model, however, the payo¤ accumulation stops during a communication phase and, as in Ben-Porath and Kahneman (2003) , the players, in general, do not receive the repeated game's history. The next section introduces notation and de…nitions. In section 3, the features of the model are demonstrated in an example. Section 4 is dedicated to derive two concepts, the information sharing process and the punishment reward phase. Both are prerequisites for the Folk Theorem, which is stated in section 5, along with conditions under which impatient players deviate from a given sequence of action pro…les. In the same section, moreover, the model's extension to strategic communication is discussed and how it relates to the imperfect monitoring and the network literature, respectively. The model is presented in pure actions. Before concluding, remarks about its extension to mixed actions follow. 4 2 Preliminaries
Stage Game
Each player i in the …nite set of players I = f1; :::; ng has a …nite and non-empty set of pure actions A i ; a pure action a i is an element of this set. The pure action space of the stage game is A = i2I A i ; with generic element a; called pure action pro…le. To emphasize player i's role, a is written as (a i ; a i ): For any non-empty set of players S I; let A S = i2S A i ; and denote by a S an element of this set. Player i's payo¤ function is a mapping h i : A ! R; and the payo¤ function h : A ! R n assigns a payo¤ vector to each pure action pro…le. The stage game in normal form is then the tuple
Finally, de…ne the convex hull of the …nite set of payo¤ vectors corresponding to pure action pro…les in G as co(G) = cofx 2 R n j 9 a 2 A : h(a) = xg:
Network
The players in set I are the vertices of a network g; whose graph is de…ned as (I; E); where E I I denotes the set of links or edges between them. A directed link from player i to player j is denoted by (i; j): Graph (I; E) is undirected, that is, for all i; j 2 I;
(i; j) if, and only if, (j; i): Given network g; a path between a pair of distinct players i and j is de…ned as a sequence of distinct players i 1 ; :::; i r such that i 1 = i; i r = j; and (i l 1 ; i l ) 2 E; for all 1 < l r: Its length is r 1: Network g is assumed to be connected. Hence, each player is connected to at least one other player directly and to all others via paths of …nite lengths. The number of links along the shortest path between two distinct players i and j is called distance between i and j and is denoted by d ij : Moreover, denote the largest distance between player i and any other player in the network by d i = max j2I d ij ; and de…ne the diameter of network g as the maximal largest distance among all players, that is, d = max i2I d i : Finally, denote player i's set of direct neighbors by i(1) = fj 2 I j d ij = 1g and, in general, for any 1 m d i ; de…ne his set of m-neighbors as i(m) = fj 2 I j d ij = mg:
When the stage game is played repeatedly, in each period, a player …rst chooses an action, in a way speci…ed below, and then makes observations and communicates with his neighbors. He observes the actions chosen by his immediate neighbors, before receiving the information they received one period earlier from their neighbors. Similarly, he reveals to any direct neighbor the action he plays, before communicating him the information he received one period ago. Hence, information ‡ows one link per period and with a d i 1 period lag, player i gets to know the repeated game's entire history. 3 It is assumed that communication is non-strategic, or in other words, that players always truthfully reveal what their neighbors did and told them. How to relax this assumption is discussed later.
Additionally, a player has perfect recall. Hence, for any player i 2 I at any t 1; there is a set of observations, denoted by Ob t i ; that includes all histories of observations that player i may have made at the end of period t: It is de…ned recursively as
for all t d i ; where for any 1 m d i and any t 1; A t i(m) = ( j2i(m) A j ) t : An observation made by player i at time t is denoted by ob t i 2 Ob t i : Given G and g; a sequence of action pro…les fa t g 1 t=1 ; where a t 2 A for all t 1; generates a sequence of observations for player i; 4
for all t d i : At any 1 t < d i ; player i is not yet informed about the behavior of at least one other player. At t = d i ; ob d i i contains the actions chosen by all players in period one. Abusing notation, this is referred to as a 1 2 ob d i i (since a 1 belongs to A): At any t > d i ; the action pro…les a 1 ; :::; a t d i +1 are identi…ed by player i; and hence, in an abuse of terminology, said to be elements of ob t i : Thus, at any t 1; the sequence of action pro…les generates an observation pro…le ob t 2 Ob t ; where Ob t = i2I Ob t i : The players organized in this way play an in…nitely repeated discounted game.
Repeated Game with Delayed Perfect Monitoring
In the in…nitely repeated discounted game played on the …xed network g; thereafter called repeated network game, at each point in discrete time, t = 1; 2; :::; the stage game G is played. Set I is assumed to contain at least three players since otherwise the analysis of the network case is trivial.
Let player i's set of strategies be F i = fff t i g 1 t=1 j f 1 i 2 A i ; and for all t > 1; f t i : Ob t 1 i ! A i g: At any t 1; player i's strategy f i = ff t i g 1 t=1 prescribes him to choose some action. For t > 1; this prescription is a mapping from his set of observations to his action set. The cartesian product of all players'strategy sets F = i2I F i ; constitutes the strategy space of the repeated network game. A strategy pro…le f = (f 1 ; :::; f n ) is an element of F: To emphasize player i's role, it is written as (f i ; f i ): At any t 1; each f 2 F recursively generates a pure action pro…le a t (f ) = (a t 1 (f ); :::; a t n (f )) and a corresponding observation pro…le ob t (f ) = (ob t 1 (f ); :::; ob t n (f )): for any player i; let a 1 i (f ) = f 1 i and ob 1 i (f ) = (a 1 i (f ); a 1 i(1) (f )); and for t > 1 given ob t 1
is de…ned accordingly. Each f 2 F thus generates a sequence of action pro…les fa t (f )g 1 t=1 ; which in turn generates a sequence of observation pro…les fob t (f )g 1 t=1 : Given a common discount factor 2 [0; 1); the function H : F ! R n assigns a payo¤ vector to each strategy pro…le of the repeated network game. Given f 2 F; player i's pay-o¤,
; is the (1 )-normalized discounted sum of stage game payo¤s. The repeated network game associated with stage game G; discount factor and network g is then de…ned as the normal form game G g;
: When g is complete, i(1) = I n fig for all i 2 I and G g; is identical to the in…nitely repeated discounted game, referred to as G : In this case, f i simpli…es: for any t > 1 it is now a mapping from A t 1 = ( i2I A i ) t 1 to A i ; that is, each player conditions his action choice on the history of action pro…les chosen by all players between periods 1 and t 1:
Moreover, the players have common knowledge of the game played, the form of the network 5 and the strategy choices available to all players. Finally and importantly, each player i observes his payo¤ with a delay of d i 1 periods. This prevents him from deducing other players'behavior by observing his payo¤. At any t d i ; however, player i knows the action pro…les played between periods 1 and t d i + 1; and hence, he can calculate or equivalently observe his payo¤ for all these periods.
Payo¤ Vectors Generated by Sequential Equilibria

Individual Rationality without a Full-Dimensional Payo¤ Space
A player's individually rational payo¤ is the lowest payo¤ to which he can be forced in a stage game. It obtains when a player maximizes his payo¤ while all others minimize it 7 and is called minmax payo¤. For any player i 2 I; the minmax payo¤ in pure actions is de…ned as
(1) ADS use the minmax payo¤ to de…ne a player's individually rational payo¤ in any repeated (network) game, 6 in which the dimension of the payo¤ space is equal to the number of players, or at most of one dimension less. They show that this dimensionality condition holds whenever no two players have equivalent payo¤ functions in the corresponding stage game. Such games ful…ll the NEU-condition of non-equivalent utilities. 7 Two distinct players i and j have equivalent utilities (EU), when one player's payo¤ function is a positive a¢ ne transformation of the other's, that is, there are > 0 and 2 R such that for all a 2 A;
This relation between EU-players i and j is denoted by i j: When (2) is violated for two distinct players i and j; they have non-equivalent utilities, denoted by i j: The EU-players are partitioned into U sets, S 1 ; :::; S U ; such that i j holds for all i; j 2 S u ; 1 u U: Let S [ u2U S u ; then i j holds for all i 2 S u ; j 2 S u 0 such that u 6 = u 0 ; and for all i = 2 S; j 2 I n fig: Finally, assume that no player is universally indi¤erent among all action pro…les, that is, for all i 2 I; there are a; a 0 2 A such that h i (a) 6 = h i (a 0 ):
When a stage game does not ful…ll the NEU-condition, that is, S 6 = ;; a player's e¤ective minmax payo¤ is his individually rational payo¤ in the corresponding repeated (network) game. Following Wen (1994) , 8 the e¤ective minmax payo¤ in pure actions of any player i 2 S u is de…ned as i min a2A maxfh i (a j ; a j ) j j 2 S u ; a j 2 A j g:
(
In each EU-group, a reference player is selected whose maximization yields any member of the group who is minimized the largest possible payo¤. The e¤ective minmax payo¤ of an EU-player, therefore, is larger than or equal to his minmax payo¤, while for all other players i = 2 S the two payo¤s obviously are identical. Denote the vector of e¤ective minmax payo¤s in pure actions by ; and the pure action pro…le forcing player i to his e¤ective minmax payo¤ by a i : It is one solution to the optimization problem on the right-hand-side of (3), on which the players agreed. Without loss of generality the e¤ective minmax payo¤ of all players is normalized to 0, that is, for all i 2 I; h i ( a i ) 0: All players with equivalent utility to i's obtain a payo¤ of 0 as well when he is forced to his e¤ective minmax payo¤.
In a perfect monitoring model, the decisions of all players in an EU-group are identical since they are based on the same information, the commonly observed history of the repeated game. Hence, one player could replace the entire group. Conversely, in the repeated network game, each member of an EU-group chooses an action based on the observations he made thus far, and usually, these do not coincide.
Set of Feasible and Strictly Individually Rational Payo¤ Vectors
The set of feasible payo¤ vectors of the repeated (network) game is de…ned as F = fx 2 R n j 9 fa t g 1 t=1 : 8 t 1; a t 2 A; and 8 i 2 I;
Following Sorin (1986) and Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994) , any payo¤ vector in co(G) is feasible for 2 (1 1 z ; 1); where z is the number of vertices of co(G): For any discount factor in this range, the sets F and co(G) coincide. Moreover, any feasible payo¤ vector is achievable by a sequence of pure action pro…les in the repeated (network) game.
The set of feasible and strictly individually rational payo¤ vectors is denoted by F : It contains all feasible payo¤ vectors that are larger than = (0; :::; 0) and is de…ned as
Any payo¤ vector in this set is a candidate to be supported by a sequential equilibrium.
Sequential Equilibrium
Kreps and Wilson's (1982) concept of sequential equilibrium requires a strategy pro…le and a system of beliefs to be sequentially rational and consistent, respectively. In the repeated network game, the attention is restricted to a class of strategy pro…les in which each player conditions his action choices only on his observations-he believes what he observes. In this class, each sequential equilibrium strategy pro…le is sequentially rational for any belief a player may have about the yet unobserved actions chosen by all other players in the most recent periods. Hence, beliefs are not modelled explicitly and a sequential equilibrium is said to exist when the condition of sequential rationality is ful…lled.
; if for all t 1 and given any ob t 2 Ob t ; f _ f (ob 1 )g 1 =t+1 is such that for all i 2 I and all f i 2 F i ;
(1 )
When g is complete this de…nition includes G and the concepts of sequential and subgame-perfect equilibrium coincide. However, equilibria of G g; and G are called sequential when De…nition 1 is satis…ed, and the corresponding sets of sequential equilibrium strategy pro…les are denoted by SE(G g; ) and SE(G ); respectively. A strategy pro…le is a sequential equilibrium if, and only if, any player's …nite unilateral deviation at any point in time is not pro…table. 9
3 The Network makes a di¤erence The unique Nash Equilibrium of stage gameĜ is the action pro…le in which all players choose D; since it is a strictly dominant action. In the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, however, it is possible to sustain strategy pro…les that yield a higher payo¤ to all players and are sequential equilibria under certain conditions, such as the trigger strategy pro…le. It prescribes each player to cooperate as long as all other players cooperate and to defect 1--2--3 Figure 1 : Three players form a Star forever if any other player defected. Given any network g; the trigger strategy of player i; denoted byf i 2 F i ; is de…ned as follows:f 1 i = C; and for t 1;
Givenf 2 F; observe that for all i 2 I and all t 1; …rst a t i (f ) = C; and second, ob t i (f ) is such that for all a j 2 ob t i (f ); a j = C as well for all 1 t and all j 2 I:
The Players form a Star
Consider a star with n = 3; where the graph of g is E = ((1; 2); (2; 1); (2; 3); (3; 2)); represented in Figure 1 . (Figure 2 representsĜ for n = 3; where player 1 chooses rows, player 2 columns and player 3 matrices.) The trigger strategy pro…le is a sequential equilibrium ofĜ g; if, and only if, all players are patient enough, that is, is higher than some threshold value. Then, none of them ever deviates. Corresponding conditions on must be found for the truncation of the repeated network Prisoner's Dilemma after any point in time, and therefore, given any observation pro…le. However, to keep this example simple, only unilateral deviations are considered, that is, simultaneous deviations of two or more players, by convention, do not occur. 10 Then, three classes of unilateral deviations can be identi…ed. Any deviation that may arise in the course of play can be uniquely allocated to one class. The three classes are 1) initial unilateral deviations, 2) subsequent unilateral deviations (before the initial is known by all players), and 3) unilateral deviations when the punishment takes place.
Obviously, unilateral deviations during the punishment are not pro…table since all players play D: The resulting action pro…le is the stage game Nash Equilibrium in strictly dominant actions. Hence, every player plays his best-reply independently of g and of :
3 C D 1-2 C D C 3, 3, 3 0, 4, 0 D 4, 0, 0 2, 2, 0 1-2 C D C 0, 0, 4 0, 2, 2 D 2, 0, 2 1, 1, 1 Figure 2 : Prisoner's Dilemma for three players For the same reason, no player can deviate pro…tably from the trigger strategy pro…le in part 2. After a player's initial deviation, he and any player who knows about it are best-o¤ to play D forever (rather than to deviate and to choose C at any point in time).
It remains to show that no player has a pro…table unilateral deviation from the trigger strategy pro…le when all players play C: Given ; player 2 (who is directly observed by 1 and 3) does not deviate in any period if, and only if,
The value of 1 3 is not only the threshold value for player 2 in this example but also the one for all players in a complete network. The network a¤ects, however, the threshold value of the remaining two players in this example. Given ; player 1 (and similarly 3) does not deviate from the trigger strategy pro…le in any period if, and only if,
which can be simpli…ed to 2 + 2 1 0: The only positive solution for in this quadratic equation is approximately 0.414. Hence, in part 1 of the sequential equilibrium conditions the requirement on ; or the players'patience, is higher in the star with three players considered here than in a complete network. This is due to the one period delay with which players 1 and 3 obtain information about each other's action choice.
This example extends to the case where n > 3 and the players form a star. The player at the center of the star has the same role as player 2 in this example, and for all other players the same conditions apply as for players 1 and 3 in this example.
The Repeated Prisoner' s Dilemma Played in any Network
A similar result can be derived for any network. Suppose that n > 3 and that all players in a network follow the trigger strategy pro…le. Then, an analogous calculation to the one for players 1 and 3 in the above example yields a condition such that no player i 2 I deviates. The corresponding expression is 2 + d i 1 0: Although it depends on d i ; even in very large networks the threshold value for is bounded above by 1 2 : Hence, for "moderately patient" players, the trigger strategy pro…le is a sequential equilibrium in any repeated network Prisoner's Dilemma when there are no multilateral deviations.
Another general result for the Prisoner's Dilemma as de…ned before can be obtainedstill abstracting from multilateral deviations. Given g and ; it is possible to determine for any sequence of action pro…les, and not only the one generated by the trigger strategy pro…le, whether it can be supported by a sequential equilibrium strategy pro…le. The key step is to calculate each player's worst payo¤ which he can ensure himself by playing D forever from any point in time on. A player's worst payo¤ is determined by the largest distance between him and any other player in the network. This is the time it takes until all players punish him, thereby best-replying to his deviation. It also depends on the sequence of action pro…les played by the other players until they are informed about his deviation. A given sequence of action pro…les can be generated by a sequential equilibrium strategy pro…le, if it yields each player at any point in time a continuation payo¤ that is larger than the player's corresponding worst payo¤ at that point in time.
It is possible to calculate an upper and a lower bound to a player's worst payo¤. For any f 2 SE(Ĝ g; ); the worst payo¤ of any player i in the repeated network Prisoner's Dilemma lies between the two identi…ed bounds. The lower bound is identical to player i's (e¤ective) minmax payo¤ i = 1: (The two concepts coincide in the Prisoner's Dilemma since it ful…lls the NEU-condition.) It is obtained when all players play D forever after his deviation (and it is independent of the network and the discount factor). The upper bound depends on a player's position in the network and on the discount factor. It is achieved, for example, for the trigger strategy pro…le. In this case, a deviator can gain The trigger strategy pro…lef 2 F generates a sequence of action pro…les such that for all i 2 I and any t 1; a t i (f ) = C: After deviating unilaterally player i receives
This upper bound of a player's worst payo¤ is strictly larger than 1, unless the network is complete, that is, d i = 1 for all players. For di¤erent values of and depending on a player's position in the network it lies between 1 and 2, as depicted in Figure 3 . For small values of ; it is close to 2 even when player i's largest distance is small. Conversely, for close to 1, the upper bound of a player's worst payo¤ is close to 1 even in large networks.
Hence, the network may reduce the set of discount factors for which a strategy pro…le is a sequential equilibrium, and moreover, for a given discount factor, the set of sequential equilibrium strategy pro…les and the corresponding set of payo¤ vectors may be strictly smaller in the repeated network game than in the version with complete network. The next step is to extend this result to repeated network games based on any stage game.
14 In general, the conditions for sequential equilibria are not as simple as in the repeated network Prisoner's Dilemma since the action pro…le forcing a player to his e¤ective minmax payo¤ does not coincide with a stage game Nash Equilibrium in strictly dominant actions. Hence, punishment is asymmetric and may be costly for some players. Additionally, since multilateral deviations may occur, the players are assumed to wait until everyone knows whether a deviation was uni-or multilateral. This allows, moreover, to coordinate punishment. In this section both issues are dealt with starting with the second one.
Until all players in the network know about an initial deviation, they are required to follow the sequence of action pro…les, although the deviator may continue to deviate or subsequent deviations by other players may occur. Once all players have identi…ed the initial deviator, they start to punish him. In case the initial deviation was multilateral, however, the players ignore it. 11 This phase of information transmission is called Information Sharing Process (ISP ): Note, that the ISP -payo¤ is not normalized by (1 ):
De…nition 2. Given f 2 F; the Information Sharing Process payo¤ of player i following an initial deviation in period t 0 only is de…ned as
Note, that an action pro…le is known by all players after d 1 periods. The ISP can be extended easily to cover a deviation of …nite length by any player. Any subsequent unilateral deviator with non-equivalent utility to the initial one starts a new ISP which, however, may overlap with the ongoing one. Once every player has identi…ed the last deviator, he is forced to his e¤ective minmax payo¤ at least until his entire gain from deviating is taken away or until another subsequent deviator is punished. All players that contribute to the punishment may incur a loss in their own payo¤ as long as it lasts. Hence, punishment should be restricted to a minimal amount of time, and the punishers should be rewarded thereafter. Obviously, the reward must not be bene…cial for the deviator-otherwise, the punishment would be reversed again.
Assume without loss of generality that all NEU-players occupy positions 1; :::;î in I; and that thereafter all players in the distinct EU-groups S 1 to S U follow. In analogy to ADS, given any feasible and strictly individually rational target payo¤ vector x 2 F ; for all NEU-players there are player-speci…c punishment reward payo¤ vectors denoted by ! 1 ; :::; !^i: They can be achieved by sequences of pure action pro…les and have the following properties. For any player i = 2 S; x i > ! i i > 0; and for two distinct players i j; ! i i < ! j i ; that is, the i-th component of vector i is strictly smaller than that of any other one.
For EU-players the punishment reward phase is simpler. Some time after player i 2 S u deviated, all members of S u are subjected to the same punishment reward since their payo¤s are equivalent to i's. Hence, it is enough to de…ne one punishment reward payo¤ vector for each EU-group. A cascade of deviations by players in S u is prevented by taking away the gain each of the deviators in this EU-group obtained, that is, by forcing the players in S u to their e¤ective minmax payo¤ for a long enough amount of time. Thereafter, the group's punishment reward phase is played. Hence, for each group S u ; 1 u U; there is one punishment reward payo¤ vector ! Su :
Given any target payo¤ vector x 2 F ; the punishment reward payo¤ vectors ! 1 ; :::; !^i; ! S 1 ; :::; ! S U ; have the following properties:
i) for all i = 2 S; x i > ! i i > 0; and for any 1 u U and all i 2 S u ; x i > ! Su i > 0:
ii) a) For all i 6 = j; i; j = 2 S; ! i i < ! j i ; b) for any 1 u U; all i 2 S u and all j = 2 S; ! Su i < ! j i and ! j j < ! Su j ; c) for all i 2 S u ; j 2 S u 0 such that u 6 = u 0 ; ! Su i < ! S u 0 i and ! S u 0 j < ! Su j ; d) and for any 1 u U; and all i; j 2 S u ; there are > 0 and 2 R such that ! Su i = ! Su j + :
The conditions in part i) are target payo¤ vector domination and individual rationality. The ones in part ii) ensure that a player is worst o¤ during his or his EU-group's punishment reward phase, but that he can be rewarded otherwise. The existence of the punishment reward payo¤ vectors for any x 2 F follows from ADS, who construct them explicitly and give the following geometric interpretation, graphically illustrated in Figure 4 . For two distinct players i j; the projection of the payo¤ space on the corresponding two player plane yields an ellipse or a line (with negative slope), whereas for all others it is a line (with positive slope). In the …rst case, the smallest i-and j-coordinates on a ball with arbitrarily small radius " > 0 about the target payo¤ vector gives the payo¤ that the corresponding player receives in his punishment reward phase. In any other case, the EU-group's punishment reward payo¤ vector is the lowest point, in which the line and the "-ball about the target payo¤ vector intersect. This intersection determines the punishment reward payo¤ of each player in the group. 
Folk Theorem
As explained above, a strategy pro…le in the repeated network game is a sequential equilibrium if, and only if, given any observation pro…le, no player's unilateral deviation from the continuation strategy pro…le is pro…table. Since each observation pro…le that may arise can be uniquely allocated to one of a small number of classes of observation pro…les, it is necessary and su¢ cient to show for each class that any player's …nite unilateral deviation is not pro…table. The outline and proof of the Folk Theorem (which can be found in appendix A) adapt some arguments of ADS and Wen to the network case.
Theorem 1. Let G and g be given. Then, for all x 2 F ; there is _ < 1 such that for each 2 ( _ ; 1); there is a correspondingf 2 F such thatf 2 SE(G g; ) and H (f ) = x:
Intuitively, strategy pro…lef prescribes the players to punish a unilateral deviator once all of them know that he deviated at least until his entire gain is taken away. Thereafter, his or his EU-group's punishment reward phase is played. Given any observation pro…le, unilateral deviations fromf are not pro…table when is close enough to 1. The Folk Theorem can be proved as well, possibly even for lower discount factors than _ ; using other strategy pro…les, as discussed in the next subsection. However, most of them are technically and intuitively more involved thanf :
Patient players in the network do not mind to obtain the history of the repeated game gradually over time. Immediate punishment or punishment that sets in after a …nite delay are equivalently strong threats for the players in this case. In the limit, the network speci…c e¤ects disappear and the same set of payo¤ vectors can be generated by sequential equilibria in the repeated game and in its network version.
Corollary 1. Let G and g be given. Then, there is < 1 such that for all 2 ( ; 1) and all x 2 F ; there aref 2 SE(G g; ) and f 2 SE(G ) such that fa t (f )g 1
There is also a lower bound of the discount factor ; and the corollary holds as well for all 2 [0; ]: For this range of discount factors, only sequences of action pro…les that prescribe the in…nite repetition of stage game Nash Equilibria can be supported by sequential equilibria in both games. Another Folk Theorem follows from Theorem 1.
Corollary 2. Let G; g and f 2 F be given and assume there is^ < 1 such that f 2 SE(G g;^ ): Then, for all 2 [^ ; 1); f 2 SE(G g; ) and H (f ) > 0:
Since network g is assumed to be undirected, a simple structure on the information transmission obtains. As already hinted in the introduction, however, the players may not be able to obtain information about each other simultaneously. The Folk Theorem extends to repeated games played on directed networks that are connected since each player still gets to know the repeated game's history with a …nite delay. Apart from this, the observation and the communication network may not coincide. A player may observe a neighbor, though he may not be able to communicate with him. Denote by (I; E Ob ) and (I; E Com ) the observation and the communication graph of the observation network g Ob and the communication network g Com ; respectively. The two graphs are de…ned as (I; E): However, both may be directed and ful…ll the following connectedness property. Each player is observed by at least one other player. The players communicate their observations via a directed network g Com such that all of them obtain the repeated network game's history after a …nite delay. 12 For any network g OC ; consisting of an observation network g Ob and a communication network g Com ; the Folk Theorem holds.
Corollary 3. Let G and g OC be given. Then, for all x 2 F ; there is • < 1 such that for each 2 ( • ; 1); there is a corresponding
Finally, note that for a given set of players the network in which the delay after which punishment starts is largest in a tree, that is, a line of length n 1: In this case, the diameter among all networks that can be formed from the set of players is maximal. Given G; letĝ be an arbitrary tree network formed by the players in set I: Then, the following corollary follows from Theorem 1.
Corollary 4. Let G;ĝ and f 2 F be given. Assume that f 2 SE(Gĝ ; ) for all 2 (^ ; 1): Then, for any g formed by set I and all 2 (^ ; 1); f 2 SE(G g; ) and H (f ) > 0:
In other networks than trees the diameter is lower, and hence also the requirement on the players'level of patience. In general, f may be a sequential equilibrium even for lower discount factors when the players form any other network than a tree.
Impatient Players
For impatient players, or in other words, for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the network may make a di¤erence. For the Prisoner's Dilemma this was shown in section 3 abstracting, however, from multilateral deviations. The aim in this section is to derive a similar result for any stage game, any network and including multilateral deviations. Ideally, it should state that for all discount factors larger than ; identi…ed after Corollary 1, and smaller than or equal to _ ; identi…ed in the Folk Theorem, the set of payo¤ vectors generated by sequential equilibria in the repeated game is a strict superset to the corresponding payo¤ set in its network version. However, as already mentioned, the Folk Theorem may hold for lower discount factors than _ when other strategy pro…les thanf are used. To identify them allows to reduce the network's e¤ects in a repeated game. Two pro…les which achieve this are described. Under both, the players use the information they receive earlier than underf :
Given any network, a player can start to punish a deviator, for example, when he knows the action pro…le of the period, in which the deviation occurred. Until then, he cannot rule out that the deviation was multilateral. Hence, with respect to any player i; the time delay, with which the players can identify player i's unilateral deviation, induces a partition of the set of players such that all players in a group observe the action pro…le played in the period of i's deviation with the same delay. After some initial delay, during which i's deviation is unpunished, the players which …rst identi…ed i's deviation start to punish him. Since the network is connected the group of punishers, thereafter, grows strictly in each period until it comprises all players, d periods after i's deviation. At the end of the previous period, all players know that the deviation occurred.
Alternatively, all players may immediately punish any deviating neighbor. 13 In subsequent periods the group of punishers grows strictly until it comprises all players. The delay until this is the case is determined by the deviator's largest distance. For at least 13 Suppose S = ;; that i deviates at t 0 from fa t g 1 t=1 and that any deviator is "minmaxed" immediately. Then, at t 0 + 1; i's payo¤ is min a i(1) 2 j2i(1) Aj max ai2Ai h i (a i ; a i(1) ; a t 0 +1 (i[i(1)) ) max ai2Ai h i (a i ; a t 0 +1 i ): In case S 6 = ;; an analogous condition can be found. one pair of players, this coincides with the network's diameter (which is the maximal largest distance between any pair of players). If a player becomes aware that the initial deviation was multilateral, he resumes playing the sequence of action pro…les.
In both cases, a consistent system of beliefs exists, for example, as described in footnote 11. To illustrate both ideas, consider a network whose graph is as depicted in Figure 1 and any stage game G: A unilateral deviation by player 1 (and similarly by player 3) is immediately identi…ed by player 2 since he also observes player 3's action choice in the period of player 1's deviation. Hence, from the subsequent period on, player 2 punishes player 1. Player 3 contributes to the punishment only from one period afterwards on.
In the repeated network game, the diameter of the network thus determines when the group of punishers comprises all players. Only then, punishment can be as e¤ective as in a complete network already one period after the deviation. Hence, the threat of punishment in any network is always equally or less strong than in a complete one.
A form of punishment which eliminates the deviator's gain entirely but at the same time minimizes the loss the punishers may incur remains to be determined. In general, this is impossible without specifying the stage game, the network, the discount factor and the sequence of action pro…les, since it is not obvious, if it is better to "minmax" a deviator, to start a punishment reward phase or some other sequence of action pro…les. However, in a sequential equilibrium strategy pro…le, unilateral deviations cannot be ignored, and hence, the time delay caused by the imposition of a network on a repeated game may reduce the set of sequential equilibria. This is expressed formally in Corollary 5, which is complementary to Corollary 1 and the condition stated thereafter.
Corollary 5. Let G and g be given. Then, there are 0 < < 1 such that for all 2 ( ; ]; ffa t (f )g 1 t=1 j f 2 SE(G g; )g ffa t ( f )g 1 t=1 j f 2 SE(G )g:
When the network is complete, the lower and upper bound of coincide and the corollary is trivially true. Otherwise, it is easily proved by induction with the arguments given above. The interplay between the delay in information transmission caused by the network and the patience of a player may reduce the set of sequential equilibria and the corresponding payo¤ set, although for large enough discount factors the Folk Theorem holds. Comparative statics on g have similar e¤ects on SE(G g; ); when due to the removal or addition of a link the network's diameter or some player's largest distance changes.
Finally, formal conditions are identi…ed under which the network reduces the set of sequential equilibria for impatient players. Given G; and g; assume that f 2 SE(G ) and let f _ a t g 1 t=1 fa t ( f )g 1 t=1 : Say that the network has an impact with respect tof ; as de…ned in Theorem 1, iff does not support f _ a t g 1 t=1 as a sequential equilibrium of G g; :
(Note, however, that this does not rule out that there is some other strategy pro…le f 6 =f such that f 2 SE(G g; ) and fa t (f )g 1 t=1 = f _ a t g 1 t=1 :) Suppose that player i can gain i +d 1
by a deviation of length d 1 from f _ a t g 1 t=1 that starts at : If i = 2 S; let
for T 2d 2: It takes d 1 periods until all players know about i's deviation, and 2d 2 periods after it, all of them know if i deviated again one period before his punishment started. An analogous expression can be obtained when i 2 S: Then, Proposition 1 identi…es conditions under which the network has an impact with respect tof .
Proposition 1. Let G; < 1 and g be given. Suppose there is f 2 SE(G ); i 2 I and 1; such that for all positive integers T 2d 2; i > i (T ): Then, the network has an impact with respect tof :
Appendix B contains the proof of Proposition 1. Intuitively, player i deviates from f _ a t g 1 t=1 ; if the punishment threat prescribed by strategy pro…lef is discounted by too much, and hence, it is not strong enough to prevent i's deviation. Therefore, the strategy pro…le de…ned in Theorem 1 does not support the sequence of action pro…les f _ a t g 1 t=1 as a sequential equilibrium of G g; ; and the network has an impact with respect tof . Similar conditions can be identi…ed for any other strategy pro…le thanf :
Strategic Communication and Related Literature
Although in certain cases strong social or legal norms may impose truthtelling on impatient economic agents, this assumption should be relaxed. The players could either decide whether to transmit information or not, or even lie. A player can be easily prevented from stopping the information transmission by the threat to punish him as if he had deviated. The second type of deviation, therefore, is more interesting but also more involved. In a sequential equilibrium initial as well as subsequent deviations have to be prevented and a sequence of di¤erent liars and deviators may be di¢ cult to disentangle for a player.
To assume that players may lie is standard in the literature. Compte (1998) and Kandori and Matsushima (1998) , for example, model imperfect private monitoring in repeated games (without network) as follows. Each player receives a distinct distorted private signal of the period's action pro…le. By publicly announcing these private observations every K > 0 periods, the players restore a public history on which they condition their action choices and a Folk Theorem obtains. Without communication the players'beliefs about where in the game tree they are might diverge and some player's pro…table deviation may be undetectable. Kandori (2003) uses a similar idea in the case of imperfect public monitoring in which all players observe the same imperfect signal of the period's action pro…le and publicly announce their own action choices. Under strategic communication a Folk Theorem obtains under weaker conditions than without communication. 14 In all cases, a payo¤ transfer mechanism provides incentives for the players to make truthful announcements. A player's payo¤ increases or decreases depending on his announcement. A similar mechanism induces the players in Kahneman (1996 and 2003) to truthfully announce their own and any neighbor's action choice publicly. These constructions require a full-dimensional payo¤ space which is even stronger than the NEU-condition.
In the repeated network game, the payo¤ of an EU-group may have to be increased and decreased at the same time under such a payo¤ transfer mechanism. This, however, is impossible. The presence of EU-players may also create the following problem. Suppose that two or three players that monitor each other belong to the same EU-group. Then, cooperation immediately breaks down because all other players anticipate a sequence of deviations by the EU-players which these will, obviously, not reveal when communicating their mutual observations of each other. Since in this setup a player does not communicate his own action choice, but only those of his neighbor(s), the problem can be solved by isolating the EU-players. They would, for example, occupy the places of players 1 and 3 in the graph depicted in Figure 1 , while a NEU-player would take player 2's. 15 Nevertheless, due to the bilateral communication structure, it is challenging to introduce strategic communication to the repeated network game. Each player receives di¤erent information gradually over time, and hence, all players can never simultaneously condition their action choices on the same (communicated) information. To prevent lies, therefore, requires, apart from isolating the EU-players in a network, to adapt the punishment reward phase. In order not to tell the lie that another player deviated, for each player i 2 I; let x i > ! j i for all j = 2 S; and x i > ! Su i for all S u : By lying a player makes himself worse o¤ under this condition. To induce a player to truthfully reveal any neighbor's deviation, additionally, for all i 2 I; let ! k i > max a k 2A k h i (a k ; a t k ) for all k 2 i(1) with k = 2 S and any t 1: The analogous condition must hold when k 2 S: Then, by tolerating k's deviation i is worse o¤ than by reporting it. The information that k deviated ‡ows 14 The Folk Theorem under imperfect public monitoring without communication in Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994) holds if the public signal allows the players to statistically detect unilateral deviations. 15 Cooperation can be sustained in any star as well when the player at the center has a constant payo¤.
throughout the network only, if this incentive constraint holds sequentially for all players in k(1); k(2); and so on. Then, lies are unpro…table for close enough to 1 and restricting the players to initial deviations only. After a history that includes lies and deviations, the construction of the punishment reward payo¤ vectors may have to be revised in order to maintain the incentives for truthtelling and complying with the strategy pro…le. However, this need not be the case. Consider the Prisoner's Dilemma introduced in section 3 and suppose that the players in any network follow the trigger strategy pro…lê f : Given that is larger than the threshold value of 1 2 ; identi…ed in subsection 3.2, no player has an incentive to lie. If all players choose C; each player is prevented from claiming that some other player deviated by the same condition which prevents him from deviating. Once cooperation is destroyed, such claims are not pro…table either. After any history, moreover, a player cannot improve his payo¤ by not reporting a deviation. Hence, truthtelling is achieved endogenously in the example of section 3, which however and as already mentioned, is a special case.
To allow for strategic communication is appealing for two reasons. First, imperfect private monitoring, which so far is imposed exogenously in many models, could be made endogenous in a general class of games. Instead of letting each player obtain a probabilistically determined amount of information, more realistically, this should depend on strategic decisions of other players. Second, information asymmetries that arise in repeated strategic interaction, such as hidden actions or hidden knowledge, could be modelled in this way. Therefore, this seems a promising direction for further research.
Network Analysis
The result that in a repeated game played on a …xed network its diameter determines whether cooperation is sustainable, for a given discount factor, is new to the network literature. Conversely, various results in this literature emphasize that cooperation depends on the clustering coe¢ cient, which gives the ratio of triads or circles of three players in a network relative to all possible combinations of three players in I: Whereas the diameter is a global measure, the clustering coe¢ cient measures local connectedness. Its importance in the network literature is due to two sociology papers. Granovetter (1973) de…nes the concept of strong links which exist, for example, between three friends when they form a triad (or a circle). This facilitates cooperation since the three friends mutually observe each other's behavior. Coleman (1988) , in turn, develops the concept of closures, which are circles of connected people as well but not necessarily of size three.
To see that a lower diameter in a network need not imply a higher clustering coe¢ cient, consider the two networks depicted in Figure 5 ; for both n = 6: The scales in part a) has 7 links and two triads, whereas the wheel in part b) has 9 links and no triad. The diameter of network a) is 3 and the one in part b) is 2. The clustering coe¢ cient of the wheel is zero, whereas the scales' one is positive. Hence, the relationship between the clustering coe¢ cient and the diameter in a network need not be monotonic. (Obviously, other examples could be constructed in which the monotonic relation holds.) Cooperation in the setup of this paper can be sustained more easily in network b). Given any stage game, for a certain range of discount factors, there are sequential equilibria in network b) which generate sequences of action pro…les that do not arise from sequential equilibria in network a). (However, as the Folk Theorem implies, for patient players this di¤erence disappears.) Conversely, in the network literature, network a) would fare much better in terms of sustaining cooperation than the one in part b) of Figure 5 .
The importance of the clustering coe¢ cient is emphasized, for example, in Lippert and Spagnolo (2005) , who model relational contracts by letting each linked pair of players play a bilateral repeated discounted Prisoner's Dilemma until one player deviates, which severs the link. They analyze di¤erent informational setups, including a case in which players can choose not to transmit information, and conclude that closures are crucial to sustain cooperation, modelled in form of sequential equilibria. Another example is Vega-Redondo, Marsili, and Slanina (2005) , who let each linked pair of players play a bilateral Prisoner's Dilemma, in which the payo¤s are stochastically decaying over time. A player severs a link once his payo¤ falls below some threshold, although as a consequence he is punished by all mutual neighbors the two players have. However, a player can create new links in each period. This yields a dynamic process whose parameter choice in ‡uences the form of the network in the long-run. Both papers are examples of setups, in which the repeated game played as well as the communication and observation process are bilateral.
Since usually a player's payo¤ depends not only on his and his neighbors' decisions but also on decisions of other players in the network, even if they are "far away", it seems realistic to consider repeated games played on a …xed network. 16 The three papers most closely related to this, however, also obtain that closures are decisive to sustain equilibria. A crucial condition for Ben-Porath and Kahneman (1996) to sustain a sequential equilibrium in their repeated game with public announcements is that there are at least three players in each group. Then, any liar can be detected in equilibrium. This is exactly identical to strong links. In their paper with costly monitoring, Ben-Porath and Kahneman (2003) require a similar condition to hold. In Renault and Tomala (1998) , in which strategic communication includes lying as well, cooperation can be sustained only in networks that are 2-connected. Intuitively, this requires two distinct paths to exist between any pair of players and is just the formal description of a closure.
The delayed perfect monitoring model yields a di¤erent result since it assumes bilateral communication. Players become informed about the repeated network game's history gradually over time. To the contrary, after a public announcement in Kahneman (1996 and 2003) , all players can immediately punish any deviator. In models, in which communication, observations and the repeated games played are bilateral, punishment is also immediate. In Renault and Tomala (1998) , play is interrupted until all players know who has cheated. Simultaneously, the payo¤ accumulation stops, which is unimportant since the repeated game is undiscounted. In the repeated network game, the impatient players-except of the deviator-may su¤er from the delay, during which punishment is less e¤ective than in a complete network. The diameter of the network captures this delay and determines together with the discount factor whether a strategy pro…le is a sequential equilibrium. This result extends to cases where the players can lie but truthtelling prevails in equilibrium. Other assumptions may also be responsible for the di¤erent outcomes. In particular, a deeper analysis of the matrices that contain the distinct networks might yield interesting results. 17 6 Final Remarks
Mixed Actions
The extension of the Folk Theorem to mixed actions is straightforward in the complete network. Additionally, a player's deviation within the support of his mixed action, which is not observed by the other players, must be prevented. FLT achieve this in the complete network setting by making future play dependent on the realized action pro…le today. By letting a high payo¤ today follow a low one tomorrow, and vice versa, FLT can make each player exactly indi¤erent among all pure actions in the support of a mixed one. 18 The Folk Theorem for the repeated network game can be extended to mixed actions using FLT's idea. A player who is punished would be forced to his e¤ective minmax payo¤ in mixed actions-apart from the punishment, mixed actions need not be used. After the number of periods equivalent to the diameter of the network has passed, every player knows the pure action pro…le generated by the mixed action in the …rst punishment period. Punishment continues, anyway, at least until this period, and then, FLT's strategy can be used to compensate the players for their choices in the …rst punishment period. Thereafter, the second punishment period is compensated, and so on. This process stops in …nite time. The main advantage of this extension is that a larger set of payo¤ vectors can be sustained by sequential equilibria. However, patient players can achieve …rst best outcomes already with pure actions.
Conclusion
In this paper, delayed perfect monitoring in an in…nitely repeated discounted game is modelled by allocating the players to a connected (and undirected) network. The Folk Theorem obtains since patient players do not mind to receive the repeated game's history gradually over time. Truthtelling can be achieved endogenously only under certain conditions, due to the bilateral communication structure and the less than full-dimensional payo¤ space. For impatient players the network may make a di¤erence which need not be big, as shown for the Prisoner's Dilemma. The interplay between the diameter of the network and the patience of the players leads to the reduction in the set of sequential equilibria. This paper also contributes to the network literature, which so far emphasized the importance of the clustering coe¢ cient for cooperation to be sustainable in a network.
As already mentioned in the introduction, this setup can be applied to various speci…c contexts. Not only companies, but also impatient people form networks and interact strategically over time, such as within a company, in any other organization, or in society at large. As long as all of them are on the same hierarchical level, this model applies. Also macroeconomic applications can be thought of. The players in a network thus might be all the companies in an economy and a deviation could be interpreted as one of them going bankrupt. 19 The network e¤ects in repeated strategic interaction can also be observed in …nancial markets. For example, innovative …nancial strategies, such as those used by hedge funds, spread throughout a network over time. Whereas at the beginning only few players use a certain strategy, over time everyone adopts a successful one.
2)ã t j ; if t 0 + d j t < t 0 + d; unless player l; where l 6 = i and l = 2 S u if i 2 S u ; deviates at any t 00 ; where t 0 + d > t 00 > t 0 : Then, restart phase 2, set t 0 = t 00 and chooseã s j accordingly. Otherwise, switch to phase 3 at t 0 + d:
3) a i j ; if t 0 + d t t 0 + T; where T is determined below. If any player l deviates at any t; where t 0 + T t t 0 + d; restart phase 2, set t 0 = t and choosẽ a s j accordingly. Otherwise, switch to phase 4 at t 0 + T + 1:
is the sequence of action pro…les that yields either ! i if i = 2 S; or ! Su if i 2 S u : If any player l deviates at any > t 0 + T; restart phase 2, set t 0 = and chooseã s j accordingly. If l = i or i; l 2 S u ; restart fc s g 1 s=1 where it was truncated by l's deviation, once phase 4 is reached again.
Phase 2 corresponds to the ISP; phase 3 to the e¤ective minmax punishment of the last deviator, and phase 4 to the punishment reward phase. After any subsequent unilateral deviation, the phase in which the game is at the time of the deviation prescribes the play of the following d 1 periods-in general, phase 2 is restarted. Then, the new deviator is punished. In case, the same player deviates again in phase 2 (and no other one does), however, this phase is not restarted, but his punishment begins d periods after his …rst deviation. His entire gain is eliminated by forcing him to his e¤ective minmax payo¤ for at least d 1 periods, or longer, if necessary. After d 1 punishment periods, all players know if he deviated again in the period before it started, and hence, for how long it has to last in order to eliminate his entire gain. A similar argument applies for several unilateral deviations by distinct players of an EU-group during phase 2. After punishing the initial deviator for at least d 1 periods, the gain of the subsequent one(s) is eliminated.
By construction, the players can ignore multilateral deviations fromf ; and it remains to show that no player's unilateral deviation fromf is ever pro…table for large enough : The Folk Theorem holds trivially when a t is a stage game Nash Equilibrium for all t; and hereafter, only strategy pro…les that do not generate such sequences of action pro…les are considered. Finally, a consistent system of beliefs, givenf ; is speci…ed in footnote 11.
The proof is organized as follows. The result for phase 2 is shown …rst since it introduces arguments used thereafter to prove the results of phases 4, 1 and 3. Note, that the following 6 combinations of players'deviations have to be shown to be unpro…table; for the …rst four i j holds, whereas for the remaining two i j holds: i 6 = j and either i; j = 2 S; or i 2 S; but j = 2 S; or j 2 S; but i = 2 S; or i 2 S u ; j 2 S u 0 such that u 6 = u 0 ; and …nally, i; j 2 S u ; or i = j: For each phase, the proof proceeds in this order. PHASE 2 Figure 6 illustrates the order of time periods in phase 2. Suppose player i = 2 S deviated at t 0 : During the ISP player j 6 = i; j = 2 S; receives ISP t 0 j : By deviating at t 00 ; where t 0 < t 00 < t 0 + d; he can maximally gain b j = max a2A [max • a j 2A j h j (• a j ; a j ) h j (a)]; since his remaining ISP -payo¤ is unchanged. However, from period t 00 +d on, he is forced to his e¤ective minmax payo¤ of 0, and then, his punishment reward phase is played. Player j's deviation at t 00 is not pro…table when for some positive integerT 2 ; where t 00 + d t 0 +T 2 ;
Substituting t 0 +T 2 t 00 with T 2 makes the right-hand-side of (4) smaller. (Since t 00 > t 0 ;
t 0 +T 2 t 00 > T 2 holds for all < 1:) Hence, (5) implies (4) and it su¢ ces to show (5).
(1 )b j (1 )
As converges to 1, (5) is ful…lled: its left-hand-side converges to zero whereas its righthand-side is strictly positive since ! i j > ! j j : This may hold for several distinct pairs of discount factor and strictly positive integer. (The last inequality is ful…lled trivially when player j's gain from punishing player i is larger than b j :) An analogous argument holds, whenever i j: The case t 00 + d > t 0 +T 2 is simpler since the sum on the left-hand-side of (5) drops out as well as j's payo¤ in the …rst period(s) of i's punishment reward phase, which for close to 1 is negligible.
For i; j 2 S u ; after player j's deviation at any t 00 ; where t 0 < t 00 < t 0 + d; the ISP about i's deviation continues. Once all players know about i's deviation, a i is played for at least d 1 periods, that is, at least until period t 0 + 2d 2: Then, a j a i is played until period t 0 + _ T 2 ; to take away player j's gain from deviating at t 00 : Since j's punishment lasts at least one period, _ T 2 > 2d 2: Thereafter, the EU-group's punishment reward phase is played. Player j's deviation at t 00 is not pro…table, if for some positive integer _ T 2 > 2d 2;
(1 )b j + t 0 + _ T 2 t 00 ! Su j t 0 +2d 2 t 00 ! Su j < 0;
(1 )b j < ( t 0 +2d 2 t 00 t 0 + _ T 2 t 00 )! Su j ;
b j < t 0 +2d 2 t 00 (1 ) 1 (1 _ T 2 (2d 2) )! Su j : When converges to 1, the right-hand-side converges to ( _ T 2 2d + 2)! Su j > 0; by l'Hospital. Since b j is a …xed positive number, the inequality is ful…lled for a large enough _ T 2 : A similar argument applies when several distinct players with equivalent utility to i's deviate sequentially during the ISP about i's deviation or when i = j; that is, one player deviates in several (subsequent) periods. Finally, select a large enough, strictly positive integer T 2 such that no player can deviate pro…tably in phase 2.
PHASE 4 and PHASE 1
The result for phase 4 is stated …rst since it implies the result for phase 1. Suppose that player i 6 = j; that i; j = 2 S; and that i is the last deviator. Player j does not deviate at ; the …rst period of i's punishment reward phase, if for some positive integerT 4 ;
(1 ) max a j 2A j h j (a j ; c 1 j ) + (1 )ISP j + T 4 ! j j ! i j < 0;
(1 ) max a j 2A j h j (a j ; c 1 j ) + (1 )ISP j < ! i j T 4 ! j j :
When converges to 1, the left-hand-side of the last inequality converges to zero whereas the right-hand-side is strictly positive (since ! i j > ! j j ; and for any < 1; T 4 < 1):
The same argument holds whenever i j; and when player j deviates in any other than the …rst period of player i's punishment reward phase since for close to 1, the payo¤ obtained at the beginning of any punishment reward phase is negligible.
If i = j; player i cannot deviate pro…tably in the^ th period of his own punishment reward phase, if there is a positive integer _ T 4 such that
where t 0 + _ T 4 +^ and ! i i j 1 s=^ +1
(1 ) P 1 s=^ +1
s 1 h i (c s ): This simpli…es to
When converges to 1, the left-hand-side of (6) is bounded above by a positive number and the right-hand-side, by l'Hospital, converges to _ T 4 ! i i j 1 s=^ +1 > 0: (Although, ! i i j 1 s=^ +1 di¤ers from ! i i ; for close to 1, this di¤erence is negligible and ! i i j 1 s=^ +1 has the same properties as ! i i :) For _ T 4 large enough, (6) holds. A similar argument applies when i; j 2 S u ; and j deviates in the punishment reward phase of his EU-group. This argument together with the one used in phase 2 above demonstrates that any player's unilateral deviation of …nite length is neither pro…table in phase 4. Finally, let T 4 be the smallest positive integer such that no player can deviate pro…tably in phase 4.
The result of phase 4 extends to phase 1 since by assumption any player's target payo¤ is strictly larger than his punishment reward payo¤. Moreover, neither …nite deviations by one player nor subsequent deviations by distinct players in an EU-group are pro…table in phase 1. Hence, also for phase 1 there is a discount factor < 1 and a positive integers T 1 such that no player can deviate pro…tably from strategy pro…lef :
PHASE 3
Suppose player i is forced to his e¤ective minmax payo¤ because he deviated at t 0 : By de…nition, neither player i nor any player j i can deviate pro…tably in this phase. Hence, suppose i; j = 2 S: Player j does not deviate at any t; where t 0 + d t t 0 + T 3 ; if
(1 )b j + (1 )ISP t j (1 ) T 3 P t= t t t h j ( a i ) < t 0 +T 3 t ! i j T 3 ! j j :
32 Proceeding as in phase 2, that is, substituting on (7)'s right-hand-side t 0 +T 3 t with T 3 (for any < 1; T 3 ( t t 0 ) > T 3 since t > t 0 ) and taking the limit of converging to 1, ful…lls (7) for at least one pair of discount factor < 1 and strictly positive integer T 3 : An analogous argument holds for deviations, or a sequence of deviations, by EU-and NEU-players. Choose T 3 large enough to prevent any such deviation.
Let T = maxfT 1 ; T 2 ; T 3 ; T 4 g; and let~ be the lowest discount factor, for which, given T; no player can deviate pro…tably in any phase. (If there are several pairs of T and for which the proof holds, the pair with the lowest discount factor is selected.) Finally, let _ = maxf~ ; 1 1 z g: Then, for any 2 ( _ ; 1);f is a sequential equilibrium strategy pro…le of G g; and H (f ) = x: Appendix B Proof of Proposition 1 Fix G; < 1 and g: Select f 2 SE(G ) that generates the sequence of action pro…les fa t ( f )g 1 t=1 f _ a t g 1 t=1 : Take a strategy pro…le with the same structure asf ; de…ned in Theorem 1, to support this sequence of action pro…les as a sequential equilibrium of G g; : Then, the network has an impact with respect tof if some player can deviate pro…tably. Consider …rst, that for some i = 2 S; some 1; and all positive integers T 2d 2;
(1 ) +d 1
Subtracting (1 ) 1 T ! i i from both sides yields i > i (T ): The network has an impact with respect tof if either the last inequality holds for some i = 2 S or an analogous condition for some i 2 S: In the second case, ! i i is substituted with ! Su i :
